4/7 A Civil Society - THE DECLINE OF TRUST AND THE CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTIONS THAT BUILD IT

While there has been a rise in the power of federal government and the increased amassing of wealth of the elite (together, “the center”), there has been a corresponding decline in social capital. We outline that here.

2.1 TRUST ISSUES

The Social Capital Campaign works with 3 definitions of social capital, outlined in a causal relationship. One, the rich network of relationships in childhood. These can help with the second, the rich network of relationships, personal and professional, that sustain across the life-course. Third, the byproduct of the first two, a societal-wide trust including trust among each other and our institutions.

In this paper, we are concerned principally with the decline of societal-wide trust, and how these declines can be reversed by an emphasis on all three sources of social capital.

2.1.1 Trust in each other

Trust in each other appears to have been on a steady decline. The General Social Survey measuring a decline from 46 percent in 1972 to 31.5 percent in 2018. The Atlantic described the findings as a “catastrophic decline” in interpersonal trust. Gallup measures the drop in trust as in excess of 80 percent in the 1970s to 55 percent in 2021. While the measures are unclear, the downward trend is clear, with Pew research showing that “71% think interpersonal confidence has worsened in the past 20 years.”

2.1.2 Trust in institutions

Gallup has been measuring and reporting the levels of trust in U.S. institutions for some decades, with the average levels of trust for all the major U.S. institutions in an unmistakable, marked and clear decline.

2.1.3 Federal government

Trust and confidence in American institutions is at an all-time low. In all three branches of the federal government: Supreme Court (25 percent), the presidency (23 percent) and Congress (7 percent). This compares with an upward trend of trust in national governments across OECD countries since 2013.

Confidence is low regardless of party affiliation, though with greater skepticism among Republican leaning voters—29 percent of Democrats and Democratic- leaning independents say they trust government just about always or most of the time, compared with 9 percent of Republicans/Republican-leaning voters.

Trust in government varies by racial group and perhaps in response to who occupies the White House: Asian (37 percent), Hispanic (29 percent) and Black (24 percent) adults. The racial group with the least trust in federal government are White adults (16 percent)—down from 77 percent in 1964.

2.1.4 Media

In Gallup’s continuing survey on how much trust and confidence Americans have in the mass media—newspapers, TV and radio—the decline of the combined score of those who do “a great deal/fair amount” has dropped to 34 percent, while those who have “not very much” or “none at all” has grown to 66 percent.

This is quite at odds with Democrat voters, where 70 percent have a “great deal/fair amount” of trust in traditional media. While Republicans are at 17 percent and Independents at 27 percent. The partisan gulf between Republican/Independents versus Democrats trust in the media opened widest from 2016 on, when Democrat trust in the media was at 76 percent in 2018—comparable to the level of trust Americans in general had in the media in the 1970s.

2.1.5 Big business

There has been a continued decline in trust in big business, with only 14 percent of Americans having a Great Deal/Quite a Lot of trust in them, including big tech at 26 percent.

2.1.6 Scientists/Experts

Trust in scientists and experts is down: confidence they’ll act in the public’s best interest down from 39 percent pre-pandemic to 29 percent, with declines in supporters of both political parties, though skepticism remains highest with Republicans. Interestingly, however, trust in hospitals and medical centers remains relatively high with 80 percent thinking they were managing the pandemic well, down from 88 percent in 2020.

2.1.7 Nonprofits

The Independent Sector “Trust in Civil Society” report in 2022 highlights findings related to the decline in trust in nonprofits and philanthropy. While trust in nonprofits and philanthropy is higher than for the government, there is still a story of decline. The Edelman Annual Trust Barometer findings are similar, with only 45 percent of Americans surveyed trusting NGOs, compared to 55 percent in 2005. Independent Sector make a distinction between nonprofits and philanthropy. Nonprofits can include “churches and religious organizations, historic societies and museums, health and human services organizations, animal or environmental groups, and groups that help veterans.” While philanthropy includes, “corporate philanthropy, private foundations, or high net worth individuals engaged in philanthropic efforts.” Trust in nonprofits is much higher at 56 percent than it is for philanthropy at 34 percent.

Trust in nonprofits is much higher at 56 percent than it is for philanthropy at 34 percent.

2.2 CIVIL SOCIETY DECLINE

We suggest that the decline in trust in these institutions is a result of the decline in social capital creating institutions across the United States.

We have outlined in our “Family Stability” and “Family Affordability” reports the challenges to the fundamental unit of society, the family, with policy recommendations for its strengthening. In our “Work” paper we outlined the demise of friendships, romantic partnerships, and the rise of people living alone at all stages of life.

Other institutions that create social capital include civil society groups such as houses of worship, nonprofit organizations, philanthropy, and volunteering. The data shows that all of these social capital creating institutions are in decline.

2.2.1 Houses of Worship

In 1999, 70 percent of Americans said they attended a house of worship. In 2020, that figure was for the first time below half at 47 percent. Church membership rates had maintained consistently at about 70 percent from the 1930s throughout the twentieth century.

A lack of religious affiliation is the main driver, but attendance is down even for those who identify with a religious belief. Decline in rates of attendance increases with younger generations with the sharpest declines in church attendance among Hispanics (from 68 percent to 45 percent since 2000) and Democrats (from 71 percent to 48 percent, compared to 77 percent to 69 percent among Republicans).

Membership of synagogue among Jewish Americans has remained steady (50 percent), as have Mormon attendance (90 percent).28 It is estimated that thousands of U.S. churches are closing each year, while the number of mosques in the U.S. are reported to have grown by 31 percent in the decade from 2010. So that the decline in house of worship attendance is mostly accounted for among Christian churches, with the steepest decline in the Catholic Church, (from 76 percent to 63 percent over the past two decades).

This decline is not inconsequential. As Ryan Streeter observes, “We also found, consistent with Putnam, that people who regularly participate in the services and activities of religious organizations are more likely to work with neighbors to fix community problems and to feel in tune with the people around them.” A decline in attendance at houses of worship contributes to a wider decline in social capital creating activity.

2.2.2 Societies and Clubs

Putnam has described the decline of societies in Bowling Alone and Upswing. In the latter, he notes how twentieth century memberships were rife among chapter- based organizations, such as the Knights of Columbus, the Elks Club, the PTA, the Scouts, and women’s clubs pre-war. Post World War II there was a boom in membership of “sports clubs, charitable groups, unions and professional groups, neighborhood associations, hobby groups, parent groups, book clubs, youth groups, fraternal organizations and veterans organizations” when “our national rate of civic involvement was at or near the top of the world rankings.”This peaked by 1969. The only counter to the decline of growth of nonprofit organizations since was a growth of national associations based in Washington D.C.—a shift from grassroots membership organizations based in local communities to memberless organizations focused on federal policy and regulation.

2.2.3 Volunteering

The Do Good Institute at the University of Maryland published research in 2018 to show that while overall volunteering hours are up, the rate of volunteers—the share of the population volunteering—was on the decline. From 28.8 percent in 2005 to 24.9 percent in 2015.

2.3 LOCAL TRUST

However, while there is a large-scale decline, including historic lows, at the national picture, the “local” picture is different and perhaps cause for less pessimism.

Levels of trust and confidence at the local level are significantly higher, even if in decline. For example, there is low societal trust but, by some measures, neighborhood trust remains buoyant. The same picture applies for government, media, big business, religion, and scientists/experts: their local counterparts all enjoy higher levels of trust.

2.3.1 Trust in each other

Falls in social trust follow a sad downward trend. However, the percentage of people who trust others “a lot” or “some” in their neighborhood remains relatively high. At 84.1 percent in the United States, according to Our World in Data. This is lower than comparable countries in the Anglosphere, like Australia (85.4 percent), Canada (84.2 percent), Ireland (87.2 percent), New Zealand (88.9 percent), or the United Kingdom (87.1 percent), but higher than much of Western or Southern Europe.34 So that while social trust as an abstract concept may be down, trust in neighbors remains high, even if this trust doesn’t translate to socializing or being friends with your neighbors.

2.3.2 Government

While confidence in federal government is at an all time low, trust and confidence is higher the more local government gets. Confidence in state government is at 57 percent, while local government is at 66 percent. While all sets of government have seen a decline in trust over the decades, it is noteworthy that local and state government remains higher in the esteem of Americans.

2.3.3 Religion

In a summary of a report on decline in church attendance, Gallup consider one of the possible drivers of decline is a general suspicion with “bigness”. Small, independent, non-denominational and locally-based congregations by contrast, for example, are experiencing growth.

2.3.4 Local media

While 50 percent of Americans feel national news organizations intend to mislead, misinform or persuade the public, only 25 percent feel the same about local media, even if trust in local media is also in decline.

With trust in local media being higher than for national media, it is then a concern, as the Civic Health Index 2021 reports, that the US has lost almost a quarter of its newspapers since 2004 (2,100 outlets), while 2000 counties, 64 percent, are without a daily newspaper at all, and between 1,300 and 1,400 communities that had newspapers of their own in 2004 now have no news coverage at all.

Rather, consolidation means that by 2020 the largest 25 newspaper chains owned a third of all newspapers in the United States, an increase from one fifth in 2004.

2.3.5 Political giving and participation

The Civic Health Report 2021, however, applauds the increase in political participation after 2016, with higher election turn outs, and citing the BLM protests as positive social-capital-creating political participation.

Similarly, the proportion of small donors that had been flatlining in the 2016 cycle accounted for 23 percent of total fundraising in the 2020 cycle, up from 15 percent in 2016.

However, it is unclear whether this activity is a rise in social-capital-building political participation or a consequence of polarization. If small donors are on the increase, this challenges the primacy of outside funding in PACs and Super PACS and could be perceived as a revitalization of civic participation. Alternatively, it could be a symptom of society-wide trust collapse, with polarization of groups drawing further funding into a super charged center.

2.3.6 Philanthropy from the periphery

While there is a decline in small giving to registered nonprofits, the state of giving in the U.S. may not be all bad. In part, it may be explained by a rise in more informal, gray philanthropic economy: mutual aid and person-to-person giving, bypassing nonprofits. This is in part generational where 57 percent of Gen Z believing giving directly, say through a GoFundMe page, has more impact than giving to nonprofits48 with such gifts not registered. 93 percent of Americans say giving is important to them, which may explain Giving Tuesday’s findings, assessing that only 10 percent of “giving” in the U.S. in 2022 was money to registered nonprofits, and only 28 percent of giving was the giving of money—perhaps the giving of material items and time outside of registered nonprofits remains strong.

2.3.7 Volunteering

A similar dynamic is visible in the rates of volunteering. While the rate of volunteers is down, the rate of Americans informally helping others remained stable between 2019 and 2021. Nearly 51 percent of Americans or 124.7 million people informally helped their neighbors between September 2020 and 2021.